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A ONE SHOT DEAL: THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD
VACCINE INJURY ACT
Andrew Clements is six years old.1 Like most other children
his age, Andrew enjoys stuffed animals and the characters from
Walt Disney's 101 Dalmatians.2 Plastic decals of black and white
spotted dogs adorn his bedroom walls, and furry, stuffed crea-
tures cover his furniture.' Any six-year-old would approve.
Yet Andrew's parents realize that their son has little more in
common with other children his age. Andrew is not enrolled in
elementary school.4 He cannot walk.5 He cannot talk.6 He cannot
sit up without assistance.7 He cannot feed himself, but must be
fed through a feeding tube.8 Although he recognizes their voices,
Andrew cannot tell his parents what he thinks or how he feels?
Andrew was not born with disabilities.10 His difficulties began
August 6, 1992, the day his mother took him for his six-month
well-baby visit and Andrew received his third DPT vaccination."
Later that evening, Andrew suffered his first seizure and was
rushed to the hospital. 2 By the age of three and a half, he had
returned to the emergency room more than seventy times and
experienced equally as many additional seizures.1" Between each
seizure, Andrew appeared a happy and healthy child.'4
1. See Arthur Allen, Shots in the Dark, WASI. POST, Aug. 30, 1998 (Magazine),
at 11; see also Clements v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No.
95-484-V, 1998 WL 481881 (Fed. Cl. July 30, 1998) (providing the decision of the
special master).
2. See Allen, supra note 1, at 21.
3. See iU






10. See id. at 11.
11. See id. at 12.
12. See id. at 12-13.
13. See id. at 13.
14. See id.
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In the fall of 1995, the Clements's family life changed perma-
nently. Andrew suffered another seizure, which lasted more
than four hours, and developed an infection that caused his body
temperature to peak at 108 degrees.15 Although he recovered,
Andrew never returned to being the relatively normal three-
year-old he had been between each previous seizure episode. 6
In July of 1995, Andrew Clements's parents filed a petition for
compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
(the Act).1 Enacted in 1986, the Act created a no-fault compen-
sation system through which parents could seek monetary relief
for vaccine-related injuries suffered by their children.' 8 Because
the Clements family blamed the DPT shot for their son's inju-
ries, they alleged that the vaccination was the cause-in-fact of
Andrew's encephalopathy and seizure disorder.' 9 Despite the
Clements's presentation of favorable evidence including testi-
mony from a medical expert, the special master assigned to their
petition denied the family's claim.2
This Note addresses both the motivation that prompted Con-
gress's passage of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
and its implementation since the Act's passage in 1986. Ulti-
mately, this Note suggests that the Act, as enforced, has not met
Congress's good intentions.
Part I discusses the purpose of the National Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Act, with particular regard to the history of immuni-
15. See id.; Clements v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-
484-V, 1998 WL 481881, at *1 (Fed. Cl. July 30, 1998).
16. See Allen, supra note 1, at 12.
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (1994).
18. The Act divides into two parts. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, which outlines the terms, requirements, and conditions under which peti-
tioners may recover, became effective in 1988 and comprises the second portion of
the Act. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
19. See Clements, 1998 WL 481881, at *1. Petitioners must meet several re-
quirements in order to assert a claim under the Act. In addition to the basic re-
quirements, petitioners may elect to claim either a Table Injury or a causation-in-
fact injury. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. Pursuant to the Act's re-
quirements, the Clements family claimed that (1) they had not collected an award or
settlement from a civil action for damages caused by the vaccine, (2) their son had
received his immunization in the United States, and (3) they had incurred more
than $1,000 in unreimbursable medical expenses. See Clements, 1998 WL 481881, at
*1.
20. See Clements, 1998 WL 481881, at *15.
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zations in the United States and the potential shortage in avail-
ability of specific vaccines in the mid-1980s. Part II addresses
the Act as a no-fault alternative to compensation, including the
Act's pleading requirements and the role of the special master in
determining whether recovery is appropriate. Part III focuses on
the standard of proof required of petitioners in order to recover,
with further emphasis on the special masters' role in adjudica-
tion of claims. Part IV concludes that Congress's initial goals in
passing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act have not
been met with respect to many petitioners. Although Congress
has achieved its goal of ensuring a sufficient supply of vaccines,
Part IV emphasizes that this victory has been realized only at
the expense of efficiency and fairness. Although the no-fault
compensation scheme has insulated the pharmaceutical industry
from liability, it has not been an equal cure for individuals in-
jured by vaccinations covered by the Act.
HISTORY OF VACCINES
The authority of states to require their citizens to be immu-
nized against certain diseases and illnesses is well-settled. 1 All
fifty states and the District of Columbia have immunization
requirements for children that must be met before they may
attend public school.2 Due to the overwhelming success of vac-
cines in reducing the overall incidence of preventable illness,
doctors and public health experts have referred to immunization
21. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905) (finding a compul-
sory state statute, which required all persons to be vaccinated against smallpox, a
valid exercise of police power under the Constitution); Lisa J. Steel, Note, National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for
Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 144, 145 (1994).
22. See Randall B. Keiser, Dgjd Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 15 (1992) (citing
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOIm. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMNT OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CHILDHOOD
IMMUNIZATIONS 1 (Comm. Print 1986)); Steel, supra note 21, at 144. Courts have
recognized the validity of requiring immunizations prior to school entrance since the
beginning of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31-32 ("[T]he
principle of vaccination as a means to prevent the spread of smallpox has been
enforced in many States by statutes making the vaccination of children a condition
of their right to enter or remain in public schools.").
1999]
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programs as one of "the single most effective [means of] health
intervention."23 At the turn of the century, infectious disease
proved to be among the greatest health risks threatening the
world population.24 One hundred and sixty children per every
one thousand births in the United States died as a direct result
of an infectious disease.25
The advent of comprehensive vaccination programs has all but
eradicated specific illnesses or significantly reduced their inci-
dence.26 Most recently, in 1993, Congress enacted a law provid-
ing free immunization for all eligible children. Known as the
Childhood Immunization Initiative (CII), this law also increased
state. and local standards for vaccination rates among preschool
age children. It set a three-year goal to have 90% of all children
in the United States fully immunized by age two.2s By the 1996
target date, the CII had been modestly successful; thirty states
and fourteen of the twenty-eight targeted urban areas had met
the original requirements. 9
Societal Response
Despite comprehensive health programs and the undeniable
health benefits achieved through immunizations, many children
remain unvaccinated against the most preventable infectious
23. Leslie K. Ball et al., Risky Business: Challenges in Vaccine Risk Communica-
tion, 101 PEDIATRICS, 453, 453 (1998); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6345 ("Vaccination of children against deadly,
disabling, but preventable infectious diseases has been one of the most spectacularly
effective public health initiatives this country has ever undertaken.").
24. See Susan K. Ellenberg & Robert T. Chen, The Complicated Task of Monitor-
ing Vaccine Safety, 112 PUB. HEALTH REP. 10, 10 (1997), available in 1997 WL
9736160.
25. See id.
26. See Keiser, supra note 22, at 15 (citing reductions in mortality rates from
measles (2250 deaths in 1941 versus 2 in 1983), and reduced incidences of polio
(57,000 cases in 1952 versus 4 in 1984) and pertussis (whooping cough) (265,000
cases in 1934 versus 2000 cases in 1982), as well as the global eradication of small-
pox).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1998) ([Elach vaccine-eligible child ...
is entitled to receive the immunization without charge for the cost of such vaccine.").
28. See Status Report on the Childhood Immunization Initiative: National, State,
and Urban Area Vaccination Coverage Levels Among Children Aged 10-35 Months:
United States, 1996, 278 JAMA 622, 623 (1997).
29. See id.
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diseases.3' Although a noble congressional effort, the CII has not
served as a permanent motivational force. In 1998, fewer than
one half of all two-year-olds were fully vaccinated. 31 The lack of
childhood immunizations has led to an average of 70,000 deaths
per year due to vaccine-preventable illnesses.32
Inadequate immunization rates among children may be due to
parents' general misunderstanding about vaccination. Some par-
ents may be unaware of the importance of immunizations, be-
lieving them to be unnecessary or a thing of the past." Con-
versely, other parents may be aware of the benefits of vaccinat-
ing their children against preventable illnesses, but may fear the
potential adverse side effects associated with some vaccines.'
Although not unfounded, their fears may be exaggerated. 5
Beneficial to the vast number of recipients, vaccinations cause
a small number of children to suffer significant adverse reac-
tions. Complicating matters is the unforeseeable nature of such
reactions. Certain physical conditions provide physicians with an
indication that a child may have a greater propensity to react to
a vaccine, but the potentially harmful side effects cannot be
predicted with any certainty.
Ideally, a recipient will experience no reaction to a vaccine.
The side effects displayed by those who do react vary greatly de-
pending on the individual. More frequently, the recipient of a
vaccine will experience local side effects, including redness and
30. See Joannie M. Schrof, Miracle Vaccines: Advances in Genetic Engineering Are
Spawning a New Generation of Powerful Disease Fighters, U.S. NEWS & WORLi




34. See Stacey Schultz, Immunization Roulette: Parents Who Don't Vaccinate Play
a Risky Game, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 1998, at 65.
35. Advancements in vaccine technology have increased both the efficacy and safe-
ty of immunizations. For instance, medical professionals favor the injected poliovirus
vaccine (IPV) over the oral polio vaccine (OPV). See Geoffrey Evans, Vaccine Liabili-
ty and Safety Revisited, 152 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MED. 7 (Jan.
1998), available in 1998 WL 12035636. Furthermore, the more dangerous whole-cell
pertussis vaccine has all but completely yielded to the newer acellular pertussis vac-
cination (DTaP). See id.
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C-.AN. 6344,
6345.
37. See id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6346-47.
1999] 313
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swelling around the injection sight, or mild systemic responses,
including drowsiness and occasional vomiting." Some vaccines
cause significantly more harmful and severe reactions.89 Though
infrequent, recipients may experience significantly elevated body
temperatures, enter a shock-like state, or in some cases suffer
convulsions and encephalopathy.' In the most rare situation, a
child may die from a vaccine.41
The risks that vaccines present may be accorded greater
weight by parents than appropriate. More than 100 million dos-
es of vaccines are issued every year to American children.42 Yet
in 1997, fewer than 100 children died as the direct result of
receiving an immunization.' Nonfatal reactions are similarly
scarce; DPT injections carry the greatest risk among childhood
vaccinations, with recipients standing a one in one hundred
thousand chance of suffering permanent brain damage." The
recent advent of safer vaccines has reduced further the risks
involved.45
The individual risks and potential societal consequences of an
unimmunized population are far greater than those posed by the
vaccinations themselves.46 Parents unwilling to face the poten-
38. See Diptheria, Tetanus, and Pertussis, NURSE PRACTITIONER, July 1996, at 94-
96 [hereinafter Diptheria] (describing adverse reactions to DPT immunizations to
include local reactions of redness, swelling and pain, and systemic reactions to in-
clude drowsiness, fretfulness, vomiting, and anorexia).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6346-47.
40. See Diptheria, supra note 38, at 94-96 (listing the more severe reactions chil-
dren may experience after receiving DPT immunization injections).
41. See Schultz, supra note 34, at 65.
42. See id. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommends that children re-
ceive six vaccines by the age of six: Hepatitis B; Diptheria, Pertussis (whooping
cough), and Tetanus (DPT); H influenza type B; Polio; Measles, Mumps, and Rubella
(MMR) (German measles); and Varicella. See id. More recently, experts have recom-
mended an oral vaccination against rotavirus, which serves as the leading cause of
gastroenteritis in small children. See Marilyn Chase, Authorities Are Urging a New
Series of Shots to Keep Kids Healthy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1999, at B1.
43. See Schultz, supra note 34, at 65.
44. See id.
45. In particular, the development of a safer acellular DPT vaccine has reduced
the health risks posed by its predecessor, a whole cell vaccine. See Allen, supra note
1, at 22. An inactivated and injectable alternative to the orally administered live
polio vaccine, which can cause paralysis, also has been made available. See Schultz,
supra note 34, at 65.
46. The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System receives approximately 10,000
314 [Vol. 41:309
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tial adverse consequences of immunizing their children may
assume their children are not at risk for exposure to vaccine-pre-
ventable illnesses because other children are immunized.47 To
the contrary, outbreaks 'of measles and pertussis in unvaccinated
persons have been documented in the last decade.48
Pharmaceutical Industry
For several decades, the risk inherent to immunization re-
mained relatively static until the recent development of safer
vaccines.4 9 Ironically, as the safety of vaccines has increased, so
has public awareness of the potential adverse side effects. For
example, the pharmaceutical industry came under sharp public
criticism due, in part, to the 1982 television documentary, "DPT
Vaccine Roulette." This documentary garnered significant media
attention and earned an Emmy nomination for its depiction of
children who suffered from irreparable neurological disabilities
after receiving DPT vaccinations.5'
As a result of the increased media attention and public aware-
ness, indiyiduals who suffered adverse reactions from vaccines
began suing the pharmaceutical companies that produced the
drugs.5 In turn, the pharmaceutical companies increased the
prices of the vaccines they produced.52 Some companies no longer
complaints per year regarding the more than 100 million vaccinations administered
to patients in the United States. See Gail Kachadourian, Vaccinations: Why Some
Parents Say No, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 8, 1998, at F6, available in 1998 WL
23631753. Of the complaints received, fewer than 15% describe serious events. See
id. The vast majority, comprising more than 85% of all cases reported, describe
events such as swelling at the site of injection or low-grade fevers. See id. Gaps in
childhood immunizations, however, can lead to potentially catastrophic outbreaks of
preventable illness. For instance, between 1974 and 1976 immunization with the per-
tussis vaccine in Japan dropped from 80% to 10% due to governmental concerns per-
taining to the whole-cell vaccine. See Allen, supra note 1, at 22. Three years later,
Japan experienced an epidemic. See id.
47. See Schultz, supra note 34, at 65.
48. See id. (noting that a measles outbreak in the early 1990s caused at least 21
deaths in the United States).
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. See Evans, supra note 35, at 7. The documentary received harsh reviews from
the medical establishment, including the American Academy of Pediatrics. See id.
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could justify financially the manufacture of specific drugs that
had become the target of increasing numbers of civil suits.53 By
1986, few pharmaceutical companies remained willing to pro-
duce childhood vaccines.M Only two companies continued to
produce DPT vaccines and only one company manufactured the
polio vaccine. 55 Facing a potentially severe shortage in available
vaccines, a decline in the number of immunized children, and
the pleas of the uncompensated victims of vaccination injuries,
Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.56
NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT
Two overriding concerns led to Congress's implementation of
the Act. Both the inadequate and inconsistent nature of existing
state tort remedies and the instability of vaccine supplies due to
prior litigation prompted Congress to enact a federal, no-fault
alternative to the conventional compensation system.57 The Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services is responsible for the
program and selects a director to ensure its proper adminis-
tration.5" The director must administer the program according to
the goals established by Congress.5 9
The Act itself consists of two parts. Part I establishes the
National Vaccine Program.6 ° This program enables the director
to coordinate vaccine research programs, vaccine safety and
efficacy testing, vaccine distribution and requires her to ensure
53. See id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348. Plaintiffs filed 24 civil actions
against pharmaceutical companies in 1980 for vaccine-related injuries; by 1985, an
average of 144 new cases were filed every year. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Cath-
erine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensation for Unavoidable Injuries: Evaluating the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV.
277, 296-97 & nn.126-28 (1991).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.N. at 6345.
55. See id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.LAN. at 6348. Two additional states, Massa-
chusetts and Michigan, produced their own DPT vaccines. See id.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1994).
57. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,
6348 (referring to the "inadequacy ... of the current approach to compensating
those who have been damaged by a vaccine" and "the instability and unpredictability
of the childhood vaccine market").
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (1994).
59. See id. § 300aa-2.
60. See id. § 300aa-1.
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the overall effectiveness of vaccine immunization programs.6
Part H establishes the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program." This program defines the terms and conditions by
which a person who has suffered a vaccination injury may seek
compensation.63
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program created a
no-fault alternative to state tort remedies. Specifically, the "bill
establishe[d] a compensation system for those persons injured by
routine pediatric vaccines."6 Intended to be both "expeditious
and fair,"65 the Act created "a scheme of recovery designed to
work faster and with greater ease than the [statesl civil tort
system."6 6 By eliminating the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate
either a defendant-manufacturer's negligence in producing or
marketing the drug, or a vaccine's defectiveness, Congress hoped
the federal alternative would reduce the number of civil actions
filed in state court .67
This federal program preempts action in state court, but does
not preclude state court action. In order to ensure that fewer
plaintiffs pursue state court remedies, the Act requires a pro-
spective plaintiff to file a petition and follow its enumerated
procedures before pursuing a remedy in a state court.68
61. See id. A detailed analysis of the first part of the Act is beyond the scope of
this Note. For a critical discussion of the first part of the Act, see Philip K. Rus-
sell, Development of Vaccines to Meet Public Health Needs: Incentives and Obstacles,
7 Risi: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV, 239, 250 (1996).
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -17 (1994)
63. See id.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6353.
65. Id.
66. Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269 (1995).
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6353.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (1994). The Act precludes petitioners from
seeking redress in state court for unspecified damages or damages greater than
$1,000 until the petition has been adjudicated fully in accordance with the Act's
requirements. See id.; see also Schafer v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1994) (discussing the relationship between the Act and the traditional methods
of tort recovery).
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Process and Procedure
If a person wishes to seek compensation under the Act, he or
she must file a petition with the United States Court of Federal
Claims (previously known as the United States Claims Court)6"
and serve it upon the Secretary of Health and Human Services.".
After filing and service, the clerk of the court must direct the
petition to a chief special master who then will assign the case
to another special master.7 ' The special master assigned to the
petition is responsible for determining whether recovery under
the Act is appropriate.7"
A petition must meet several requirements before the special
master will consider whether to compensate the plaintiff under
the Act. First, the petition must contain affidavits and documen-
tation that demonstrate the petitioner received a vaccine listed
on the Act's "Vaccine Injury Table."'3 The Table contains both a
list of recognized vaccine-caused injuries as well as a list of the
specified time periods when a vaccine-caused injury must pres-
ent itself in order to be recognized as a Table injury.74 If the pe-
titioner demonstrates that the vaccine caused a Table injury
within the specified time period, then the petitioner is entitled
to a presumption of causation.7" If the petitioner cannot demon-
strate that the vaccine caused an injury specified by the Table or
cannot show a manifestation of symptoms within the time frame
recognized by the Table, then the petitioner must demonstrate,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the recognized vaccine
was the cause-in-fact of the adverse reaction.7"
69. The name change took place on October 29, 1992 with the passage of the
Federal Court Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1994)). The formalistic change carried no
implications for the substantive procedures required by the Act. See Walker v. Secre-
tary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 33 Fed. Cl. 97, 98 n.1 (1995).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1) (1994).
71. See id.
72. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (providing details of the special
masters' role in claims adjudication).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (1994).
74. See Vaccine Injury Compensation, 42 C.F.R. pt. 100.3 (1998) (providing the
most recently revised Vaccine Injury Table).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(A) (1994); see also Terran v. Secretary of the
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl. 330, 333 (1998) (providing a detailed
description of the means by which a plaintiff may demonstrate causation).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(C) (1994); see also Terran, 41 Fed. C1. at 333.
318 [Vol. 41:309
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The special master who presides over each case ultimately
determines whether to award the petitioner compensation.77
Should the special master determine that compensation is ap-
propriate, then the petitioner may recover not only medical ex-
penses that cannot be reimbursed and that were incurred prior
to receipt of judgment, but also expected future medical ex-
penses.71 In addition, the special master may award lost earn-
ings,79 damages for pain and suffering that do not exceed
$250,000,80 and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.8 ' If the
petitioner has died as a direct result of a vaccine injury, the
special master may award no more than $250,000.82 The Act
specifically precludes the award of punitive and exemplary dam-
ages.8
3
RELATIVE LACK OF SUCCESS
Consistent with one congressional goal, the Act has succeeded
in reducing the amount of state court litigation involving the
pharmaceutical industry."M The Act has failed, however, to
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13 (1994). For petitioners injurea by a vaccine adminis-
tered after adoption of the Act, compensation is awarded from the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund. See 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15()(4)(A)
(1994). For petitioners injured before the effective date, compensation is awarded
from funds appropriated by Congress to the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(f)(4)(B), 15(j) (1994).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
79. See id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A)-(B).
80. See id. § 300aa-15(a)(4).
81. See id § 300aa-15(e). Note that a special master may award attorneys' fees
and costs when a petitioner is denied compensation as long as the special master
find the petitioner filed the claim in good faith and on a reasonable basis. See id.
82. See id. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
83. See id. § 300aa-15(d)(1). -
84. See Bureau of Health Professions, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Background Information on VICP (last modified Sept. 13, 1999) <http'J/www.hrsa.
dhhs.gov/bhpr/vicp/abdvic.htm>. DTP suits filed against manufacturers reached an all-
time high in 1986. Between 1986, the year Congress enacted the Act, and 1994, the
number of suits filed against members of the pharmaceutical industry decreased
dramatically. In 1986, more than 250 lawsuits were filed against manufacturers of
DTP vaccines. See id. From 1990 to 1997, petitioners averaged fewer than twenty
suits per year. See id. In 1997, petitioners filed only four lawsuits. See id. In addi-
tion to suits filed against manufacturers, the number of suits filed against physi-
cians and other health care professions for vaccine-induced injuries also has de-
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achieve another equally important goal of Congress; to facilitate
petitioners' recovery for vaccine-related injuries.
An initial review of the Act can be deceiving with respect to
the latter goal. Between 1988 and 1999, petitioners filed a total
of 5717 claims in accordance with the Act's requirements.85 A
total of 4969 cases have been adjudicated to date, and special
masters have awarded over $1 billion in damages and attor-
ney's fees.86 In total, more than 1300 petitioners received com-
pensation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
Act.8
7
Despite the size of these numbers, more than two-thirds of all
claims filed by petitioners ultimately are dismissed.8 8 Both the
overwhelming authority of the special masters and the causation
requirements of the Act have caused the majority of persons
injured by vaccines to be denied compensation. 9
Although the Act has promoted consistency with respect to the
number of claims dismissed, in no other regard may its imple-
mentation be considered fair to petitioners. More often than not,
petitioners denied compensation under the Act remain uncom-
pensated.90 Not only does the Act delay the filing of civil actions
(and therefore delay the receipt of compensation), but it also
hurts many petitioners who will likely be unable to recover in
state court. As Congress noted when it enacted the federal no-
fault alternative, plaintiffs in state courts have great difficulty
demonstrating that a manufacturer behaved negligently or that
a vaccine itself was defective.9 '
creased. See id.
85. See Bureau of Health Professions, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Na-
tional Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Monthly Statistics Report Through
March 10, 1999 (last modified Oct. 15, 1999) <http:/www.hrsa.dhhs.gov/bhprvicp/
monthly.htm>.
86. See id.
87. See id. (listing a total of 1493 compensated claims).
88. See id. (listing a total of 3516 dismissed claims).
89. See id.
90. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 12 (1986) (stating that the Act "is also intended
to compensate persons with recognized vaccine injuries ... without a demonstration
that a manufacturer was negligent or that a vaccine was defective"), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C-.N. 6344, 6353.
320 [Vol. 41:309
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Special Masters
The overwhelming discretion held by the special master in
each petition filed under the Act represents one of the flaws
inherent in the Act. After a petition is filed, a chief special mas-
ter is responsible for distributing the claims to one of seven
other special masters.92 The special master assigned to the claim
has complete jurisdiction over the initial proceedings.9" More-
over, the means of selecting special masters compounds the
effects of their unbridled discretion. The majority of the judges
seated on the United States Federal Claims Court appoint each
special master to a four-year term.94 Once chosen, special mas-
ters may be removed only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect
of duty, or physical or mental disability.
95
Petitioners' Counterbalances
The selection process for special masters, which facilitates
their entrenchment, is not without a counterbalance for petition-
ers. Should a special master deny compensation,96 a petitioner
may move for a review of the decision by the United States
Court of Federal Claims within thirty days of the special
master's rejection." The Court of Federal Claims then has 120
days from the filing of a response to complete its action, subject
to a ninety-day suspension period should it choose to remand the
case to the special master.98 If the petitioner remains dissatisfied
with the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, the petitioner
may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit within sixty days of the lower court's ruling.99
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(1) (1994).
93. See id. § 3O0aa-12(a).
94. See id. § 300aa-12(c)(4).
95. See id. § 300aa-12(c)(2).
96. When a petition before the special master or the Court of Federal Claims
requires more than 420 days (subject to additional suspension periods), the special
master or the court must notify the petitioner of his or her right either to withdraw
the claim or to elect to maintain the claim before the special master. See id. §
300aa-12(g)(2).
97. See i& § 300aa-12(e). Both the plaintiff and the Department of Health and
Human Services retain the right to move for review. See id. Once either party so
moves, the respondent then has 30 days to file a response. See id.
98. See id. § 300aa-12(e)(2).
99. See id. § 300aa-12(f). Petitioners cannot seek review by the Court of Appeals
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As a second counterbalance to the special masters' authority,
a petitioner may file a subsequent civil action in state court.
Should the petitioner either receive no award, or believe the
damages awarded are insufficient, the petitioner may choose to
reject the decision of the special master. Although the Act pre-
cludes the initiation of a civil action concurrent or prior to the
filing of a petition with the Court of Federal Claims,' ° a peti-
tioner's rejection of the special master's decision triggers that
petitioner's right to pursue a remedy in state court.10 1
Insufficient Recourse
The Act's requirement of efficiency is not concomitant with the
notion of fairness to petitioners. The time limitations that peti-
tioners may expect, and that the courts must meet, appear to
achieve the efficiency prong of Congress's aim to ensure the
"expeditious and fair" compensation of vaccine-injured per-
sons.0 ' Although the time limitations make the process more
expeditious, they do not make it any more fair. The court's effi-
ciency does little to curtail the authority of the special masters.
The highly deferential standards of review that courts use
contribute to the failure of the present system to afford petition-
ers the fairness Congress intended. Courts will reverse the deci-
sion of a special master only with a finding that the special
master abused his or her discretion with respect to the original
petition.' In reviewing the special master's holding, the federal
claims court may set aside the ruling only if the decision is "ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."' The standard ensures a highly defer-
for the Federal Circuit until they have appealed the original decision of the special
master to the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Grimes v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 988 F.2d 1196, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(c).
101. See id. § 300aa-21(a).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 12 (1986) (describing congressional goals in pass-
ing the Act), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6353.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B) (1994). Alternatively, the judge either may
affirm the special master's findings or remand the case for further action. See id. §
300aa-12(e)(2).
104. Id. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B).
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ential review, making it unlikely that the special master's find-
ing will be overturned. 5
The standard of review employed by the court of appeals com-
pounds the deference afforded the special master by the federal
claims court. Should the special master deny compensation and
the federal claims court affirm the judgment, then the petitioner
appealing to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals encounters
further obstacles. The statute itself imposes no standard of re-
view for the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.0 6 In Munn v.
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services,'
however, the court determined that the decision of the federal
claims court deserves the same deferential review as does the
special master's determination.' The court justified its decision
stating that "[any other standard would create an anomalous
situation.., in which the affirming decision (the Claims Court's
judgment) [is] more readily overturned than the original decision
(that of the special master)."0 9
Anomalous situations notwithstanding, the deferential review
afforded the special master by the federal claims court and the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals virtually ensures that the spe-
cial master's findings will not be disturbed on appeal. The fact
that reasonable persons might differ with the special master's
conclusion is insufficient to warrant reversal."0 The appeals
courts will affirm the decision as long as the special master
articulates a rational basis for his or her decision."'
105. See Munn v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863,
869 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the review as one that gives "the special master's
determinations decisional effect" and "is highly deferential to the factual findings of
the special master").
106. See id.
107. 970 F.2d 863 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
108. See id. at 870.
[Ilt follows that the Claims Courfs judgment is entitled to at least the
same deference by us as that accorded the special master by the Claims
Court. That is, we may not disturb the judgment of the Claims Court
unless we find that judgment to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Id.
109. Id. at 871.
110. See Schwenk v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 91-
5133, 1992 WL 26022, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 1992) ("That reasonable individuals
might reach different conclusions . . . is not a sufficient ground for reversal.").
111. See Walker v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 33 Fed. Cl.
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In an environment in which the factual determinations of the
special master are of critical importance, the standard of review
has created a situation in which the Act's enforcement is- inimi-
cal to Congress's intent. Affording special masters "the most
deferential [review] possible"'12 contravenes Congress's intent to
ensure the fair adjudication of claims for vaccine-injured per-
sons.
The Burden of "Fairness"
The burden of persuasion that the petitioner bears in his or
her petition for compensation exacerbates the fairness problems
posed by the deferential review. The Act requires that each
petitioner demonstrate a vaccine-related injury."3 The petitioner
is entitled to a presumption of causation if he or she can demon-
strate that a Table-recognized injury followed the administration
of a vaccine listed on the Vaccine Injury Table within the time
specified in the Table."' If the petitioner can demonstrate only
that he or she received a Table-recognized vaccine, the petitioner
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine
caused the complained of injury."' A petitioner must sustain
this burden through the presentation of either medical records
or expert testimony.
116
Causation and Special Masters
That petitioners must prove the causation element in order to
receive compensation may at first seem reasonable. The broad
97, 100 (1995); see also, e.g., Hovey v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 397, 402 (1997) (upholding a special master's decision to deny an
evidentiary hearing and dismiss a petition when the special Master "thoroughly
weighed the evidence and reached a factually supportable conclusion"), appeal dis-
missed, 135 F.3d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
112. See Munn, 970 F.2d at 870 (citing Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Stan-
dards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REV. 469, 476 (1988)).
113. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1) (1994); see also Buxkemper v. Secretary of the
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 32 Fed. Cl 213, 220-22 (1994) (summarizing the
evidentiary requirements a petitioner must meet in order to satisfy the Act's stan-
dard of proof).
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discretion of the special master, however, nullifies any reason-
ableness granted to petitioners by the flexible, alternative means
of demonstrating an injury. As discussed above, under the latter
alternative, the petitioner must prove causation in the statutory
scheme. The petitioner must submit "'evidence that makes the
existence of a contested fact more likely than not."1 7 The proba-
bility that a fact exists in the petitioner's favor is not sufficient
to establish it as true."8 Rather, the special master "must 'be-
lieve that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-
existence, before the [special master] may find in favor of the
party who has the burden to persuade."' Despite the existence
of guidelines that the special master must consider when evalu-
ating each petition, 2 0 no other factors militate against the "vir-
tually unreviewable" determinations of the special master.'"
The Act attempts to provide fairness to petitioners, but falls
short. It requires special masters to "afford all interested per-
sons an opportunity to submit relevant written information,'"12
2
and to consider all relevant and reliable evidence.' Neverthe-
less, the Act provides few additional guidelines for special mas-
ters. The Act does not require special masters to hold evidentia-
ry hearings, m  nor does it bind them to federal common law or
117. Thornton v. Secretary of the Dep't Health & Human Servs., 35 Fed. Cl. 432,
440 (1996) (quoting Arrowood v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
28 Fed. Cl. 453, 458 (1993) (quoting McClendon v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 23 Cl. Ct. 191, 195 (1991) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1064
(5th ed. 1979)))).
118. See Thornton, 35 Fed. Cl. at 440.
119. Id. (quoting Ciotoli v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 18
Cl. Ct. 576, 588 (1989) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 250-51 (1965)))).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(b)(1); see also Thornton, 35 Fed. Cl. at 440-41 (list-
ing the guidelines provided in the Act as relevant considerations for the special
master).
121. Phillips v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 988 F.2d 111,
112 (1993).
122. Hovey v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 397,
400 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(iv) (1994)) (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 400-01 (citing Vaccine Rules of the Office of Special Masters, in
RCPC app. J).
124. See Burns v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 415,
417 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hovey, 38 Fed. CL. at 400-01 (noting that the Vaccine Rules
accord special masters extensive discretion in conducting proceedings).
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statutory rules of evidence. 5 The Act requires merely that spe-
cial masters abide by the Vaccine Rules and provide "each party
[with] a full and fair opportunity to present its case." 6
The Vaccine Injury Table
For its part, the Vaccine Injury Table does not temper the
discretion that the special masters hold. Whether petitioners at-
tempt to demonstrate a Table injury within the time specified in
the Table or attempt to prove actual causation, the Table is both
over-and under-structured to meet Congress's fairness goal.
An initial review of the Table does not indicate its inherent
problems. First, the Table itself has not remained static. 127 In
passing the Act, Congress recognized that future medical discov-
eries would challenge the efficacy of the Table in providing fair
recovery for petitioners2' To address such issues, Congress
authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
amend the Table as needed.129 Such amendments are to be based
on the research and published findings of 'the Institute of Medi-
cine (IOM), a division of the National Academy of Science, and
the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines (ACCV).13 °
Composed of health care professions, legal experts, federal offi-
cials, and interested citizens (including several parents of vac-
cine-injured children), the ACCV retains a statutorily created
ninety-day comment period for each revision proposed by the
Secretary. 1
3 1
In addition to the statutorily created review committees that
are designed to achieve some semblance of fairness in the Table,
the Secretary designated several committees to serve as addi-
125. See Hovey, 38 Fed. Cl. at 400.
126. Id. at 401 (describing the Vaccine Rules of the Office of Special Masters, in
RCFC app. J).
127. See O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1996).
128. See id. ("[Tihe first iteration of the Table was not perfect .... [Tihe solons
knowingly used incomplete data when forging the causal links between vaccines and
associated medical conditions.").
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c)(3) (1994).
130. See id. § 300aa-19; see also O'Connell, 79 F.3d at 173-74 (describing the IOM
and the ACCV).
131. See O'Connell, 79 F.3d at 173-74.
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tional resources. 112 The Secretary created the Public Health
Service Task Force and enlisted the aid of the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee (NVAC) in order to ensure an accurate and
effective Table.133 Nevertheless, despite Congress's and the
Secretary's goals in implementing the advisory committees, the
Table's structure remains an ineffective means of compensating
victims.
First, the Table is overstructured. The Table provides a list of
vaccines compensable under the Act, the symptoms recognized
as an injury caused by the specific vaccines, and the time period
within which the bona fide symptoms must manifest themselves
in the injured person."3 Theoretically, this system of concomi-
tant requirements should ensure greater consistency among
different claims. Nevertheless, it does not create a fair system of
recovery.15 Particularly with regard to the timing elements, a
petitioner may be able to demonstrate a vaccine injury, but not
be able to demonstrate that the injury occurred within the exact
specified time.' For instance, in Ultimo v. Secretary of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services,'37 the special master
ruled that a child who suffered from seizures approximately 78-
132. See id.
133. See id. at 174-75. NVAC differs from the ACCV in its advisory capacity to the
Secretary. The former serves in a more general capacity by advising the Secretary
about national programs for vaccine-education and immunization. See id. The latter's
role is reserved specifically for consideration of compensation issues. See id.
134. The Vaccine Injury Table is supplemented by the Qualifications and Aids in
Interpretation (QAI), which provides detailed explanations and definitions of the
terms identified in the Table. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-(14)(b) (1994); O'Connell, 79
F.3d at 173.
135. See Terran v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl.
330, 334-35 (1998).
136. For instance, a petitioner who claims that a whole-cell pertssis vaccine in-
duced anaphylactic shock in the recipient of the vaccine must demonstrate that the
reaction occurred within four hours of the injection. See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1998).
Similarly, a petitioner wishing to show that the immunization induced encephalopa-
thy must demonstrate that the onset occurred within 72 hours after the injection.
See id A petitioner who cannot demonstrate that a recognized Table injury occurred
within a recognized Table time is not entitled to a presumption of causation. Accord-
ingly, if the petitioner can demonstrate that anaphylactic shock occurred five hours
after an injection, but not four, he or she must pursue recovery under the latter
method.
137. 28 Fed. Cl. 148 (1993).
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80 hours after receiving a vaccination did not meet the "3 day"
time period required by the Table. 8'
Ironically, the special master, who retains considerable discre-
tion in almost every element of the Act's enforcement, has no
discretion with respect to the Table. 89 A petitioner must attempt
to show the more difficult standard of actual causation if he or
she cannot meet the Table requirements.' 0 Accordingly, petition-
ers receiving identical vaccines with identical injuries may have
to pursue different methods of recovery for any one of several
reasons. First, one petitioner's injury may have manifested itself
within the time period recognized in the Table, entitling that
person, but not his almost identically situated counterpart, to a
presumption of causation. Second, two petitioners may have the
same recognized injury, manifested within the same time, but
one may be ineligible for the presumption because the Secretary
has since narrowed the Table.141
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
Few can doubt the present ineffectiveness of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Neither Congress's goal to ensure
the efficiency with which vaccine-injured persons can recover for
their injuries nor its attempt to increase the fairness in that pro-
cess has been met.
Underlying the Act's substantive problems is the fact depen-
dent nature inherent to each petition. Whether a petitioner
138. See i&L at 150-51. At the time of the decision, the Table specifically designated
a "3 day," rather than a "72 hour" time frame. Id.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13 (1994).
140. The latter alternative is more difficult because, as mentioned previously, the
petitioner is not entitled to a presumption of causation.
141. The Secretary's revision of the Table with respect to DPT illustrates this
point. In 1995, Donna Shalala, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, significantly abrogated both the number of Table-recognized injuries
(eliminating seizure and shock collapse disorders and redefining brain injury and
inflammation) and reduced the timing requirements (requiring anaphlayctic shock to
occur within four hours of immunization). See John Hanchette & Sunny Kaplan, An
Abysmal Failure, CINCINNATI INQUIRER, Aug. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL
3785443; see also Terran v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 41
Fed. Cl. 330, 335 (1998) ("Retroactive application of Table revisions allows cases to
be decided using the most accurate causation information, regardless of when the
injury occurred.").
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alleges a Table injury within the time period specified by the Ta-
ble in order to receive a presumption of causation or attempts to
establish causation-in-fact, the petitioner's ability to recover is
highly dependent upon the facts surrounding the administration
of the injury-producing vaccine.'42
Congress recognized the importance of such factual determi-
nations when it enacted the Act in 1986.1' It initially considered
the creation of an administrative agency or other extra-judicial
body to handle petitioners' claims.' Congress also entertained
the creation of a hearing process through which a petitioner
would be bound by the decision of a panel composed of persons
selected by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.'45
Eventually Congress focused on administering the Act through
the existing court system and created the Office of the Special
Master in order to administer the fact finding required by the
Act.'4
Though this Note addresses the overwhelming problems of the
Act, specifically the dangers associated with special masters'
powerful discretion, achievement of the Act's goals is not impos-
sible. First, and perhaps most drastically, the Act could be com-
pletely restructured. Instead of having an entirely court-based
process, administration of the Act could be founded in an extra-
judicial body or an administrative agency, as Congress had con-
sidered originally.47 Nevertheless, because such an approach
would constitute a complete overhaul of the Act, an alternative
solution should be considered.
Rather than implement an entirely new process for recovery
under the Act, Congress could revamp the current process by
clearly stating the standard of review to be applied on appeal.
Though the Act requires review of a special master's decision by
142. See Bradley v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 991 F.2d
1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. See Munn v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863,
868 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. Congress initially granted jurisdiction to the federal district courts, but
upon reconsideration created the Office of the Special Master within the Federal
Claims Court. See id.
147. See id.
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the Court of Federal Claims under an arbitrary and capricious
standard,' 4 it does not clearly require a specific standard of rev-
iew for appeals to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 49 Al-
though many courts follow the decision in Munn, which deter-
mined that Federal Claims Court decisions are subject to the
same arbitrary and capricious standard of review by the Federal
Circuit Court," ° a type of review similar to that found in Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC) decisions is viable."' Under
this scenario, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals would direct-
ly review the decision of the special master and would not limit
its review to the decision of the Court of Federal Claims. Al-
though the standard would remain one requiring arbitrariness
or capriciousness, the court would directly review the decision of
the special master, not indirectly through a review of the Fed-
eral Claims Court decision.
152
There are several reasons why this latter alternative could
enhance the effectiveness of the Act. First, direct review of spe-
cial masters' decisions by both the Court of Federal Claims and
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals could serve as an addition-
al check against the power of the special master previously dis-
cussed in this Note. Second, the additional scrutiny of the court
of appeals could aid the consistency with which petitioners re-
cover under the Act.
Nevertheless, employing such a standard of review will not
serve as a cure-all to the Act. It will not affect the over- and
under-inclusiveness of the Table. As stated previously, this ap-
proach would continue to require the reviewing court to find a
special master's decision arbitrary or capricious in order to re-
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2) (1994); see also Munn, 970 F.2d at 869 (describ-
ing that a Federal Claims Court may set aside a special master's findings of fact or
conclusions of law only when they are arbitrary or capricious).
149. See Munn, 970 F.2d at 869; supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
150. See id. at 870 ("[We may not disturb the judgment of the Claims Court un-
less we find that judgment to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.").
151. See Bradley v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 991 F.2d
1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. See id. at 1577-78 (describing that the decisions of the ITC are reviewed first
by the Court of International Trade (CIT), and then reviewed by the Federal Circuit
as if no intermediate review by the CIT had taken place).
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verse that decision. In a system completely dependent on factual
determinations, however, it may serve to enhance the fairness of
the Act without further compromising its efficiency.
CONCLUSION
A brief return to the Clements family highlights the general
problems of the Act expounded in this Note. As described above,
the special master presiding over Andrew's claim denied recov-
ery. Though Special Master Millman found the case "tragic," she
concluded the Clements family had not demonstrated that
Andrew's DPT vaccines were the cause-in-fact of his injuries.'53
Stating that she "sympathizes with the Clements family for
their situation," Special Master Millman concluded her decision
by noting that "petitioners may prevail solely on the evidence
they present, not on the sympathy they engender.""
All sympathy aside, in slightly different but similar circum-
stances, Andrew might have recovered under the Act. In a differ-
ent year or through the review of a different special master, the
evidence the Clements family presented could have been deemed
sufficient. Though Special Master Millman found the Secretary's
expert more credible than the experts testifying for the
Clements family,115 another special master may have reached a
different conclusion. Such a favorable determination would have
supported a finding that Andrew's injuries were caused by his
DPT vaccine. Nevertheless, the unbridled discretion afforded the
special masters and criticized in this Note facilitates these in-
consistencies.
In addition, Andrew may have been able to recover had the
claim been filed prior to a 1995 revision in the Table.'56 Under
earlier regulations, Andrew's seizure disorder and encephalopa-
thy were recognized by the Vaccine Injury Table.5" The present
regulations have eliminated the residual seizure disorder from
153. Clements v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-484-V,
1998 WL 481881, at *15 (Fed. Cl. July 30, 1998).
154. Id.
155. See il. at *11-*12.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994); Clements, 1998 WL 481881, at *16 n.2.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14.
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the Table and have modified the symptoms required for enceph-
alopathy to be recognized by the Table.158 Unfortunately, the
Clements's filed their petition after the changes in the Table
became effective. Thus, they could prevail only by proving cau-
sation-in-fact. 159 The Clements family's situation further brings
to life the problems with the Table identified in this Note.
Finally, Andrew's troubles may not be over. Though his family
may request review by the Court of Federal Claims and may
further appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the like-
lihood that he will succeed is doubtful. Until the appellate courts
become willing to review the findings of the special master with
greater skepticism, children like Andrew Clements will gain
nothing more than a guarantee that they will not contract a
vaccine-preventable illness. This is an extremely high price to
pay given the emotional and physical toll the vaccine takes on
the families of children who suffer the adverse reactions.
Elizabeth A Breen
158. See Clements, 1998 WL 481881, at *16 n.2.
159. See id.
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